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Abstract. We focus on an agency problem encountered by mortgage lenders and investors
in mortgage-backed securities when the underlying collateral is originated by third
parties. Third parties, such as mortgage brokers, have economic incentives to encourage
borrowers to reﬁnance and, accordingly, their actions may affect asset values. We sketch
the principal-agent problem and examine two sets of data. Results support the argument:
loans originated by third parties are signiﬁcantly more likely to prepay after controlling
for other known determinants of termination risk. Moreover, third party loans are about
three times as sensitive to reﬁnancing incentives, compared to retail loans.
Introduction
A basic tenant of ﬁnance is that the value of an asset is the present value of its future
cash ﬂows. In the case of mortgages and mortgage-backed securities, prepayment
estimation is essential in forecasting expected mortgage cash ﬂow patterns.
Accordingly, security prices are highly dependent on prepayment assumptions. With
roughly 1.7 trillion dollars in mortgage loans securitized, many of which re-packaged
into highly volatile derivative instruments, accurate forecasting of mortgage loan
prepayments is of increasing importance to a wide variety of players in the capital
markets.
In this article, we focus on an agency problem encountered by mortgage lenders and
investors in mortgage-backed securities when the underlying collateral is originated
by third parties (TPOs), such as mortgage brokers. We show how the contractual
relationship between mortgage lender and third party originator may be cast in terms
of the classic principal-agent problem. Since prepayment risk is not shared between
lender and originator, TPOs can ‘‘churn’’ the customer, earning additional fees every
time the mortgage is reﬁnanced. Regression results using loan level data on mortgage
terminations over the period 1992–1997 supports the argument. Results show that
loans originated through third parties are signiﬁcantly more likely to prepay, after
controlling for re-ﬁnancing incentive, loan type and size, and age. While it is difﬁcult,
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if not impossible, to control for all borrower characteristics that may affect prepayment
probabilities, the magnitude of these effects strongly supports the agency problem
hypothesis developed. Additional market level data is consistent with loan level
regression results, although the magnitude of the difference appears much smaller.
Institutional Background
The secondary mortgage market represents a large segment of the bond market. As
of 1998, about 60% of single-family mortgage debt has been securitized, with the
bulk of these loans pooled into mortgage pass-through securities issued by the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation or the Federal National Mortgage Corporation
(collectively called the government-sponsored enterprises or GSEs). Loans larger than
the congressionally set loan limits, currently $240,000, are often securitized by major
mortgage banking ﬁrms, these issues are known as ‘‘non-agency’’ or ‘‘private label’’
mortgage-backed securities (MBS). Agency guaranties protect investors from default
risk; in the case of non-agency securities, subordinate bond structures provide this
protection. But since, in general, borrowers may prepay their mortgage at any time
without penalty, investors in MBS are exposed to prepayment risk, which increases
as interest rates fall and reﬁnancing becomes more attractive. Even in a stable interest
rate environment, investors are exposed to prepayment risk, since borrowers who pay
off their mortgage early to move to another house produce unscheduled cash ﬂows to
the mortgage pool. The rate at which these unscheduled cash ﬂows arrive is known
in the industry as the single-monthly-mortality rate (SMM) or, on an annualized basis,
the conditional prepayment rate (CPR).1 While investors in MBS bear this risk
directly, ﬁrms that sell these mortgage pools to the GSEs, or to the capital markets
directly in non-agency issues, retain exposure. Those ﬁrms typically service the loans
they sell on behalf of the investor, retaining a servicing fee, usually 25 basis points
for a conventional ﬁxed rate product, that is a function of the principal balance of
loan. This cash ﬂow stream, known as the ‘‘servicing asset’’ in the industry, behaves
much like an interest-only (IO) strip: when interest rates fall, principal balances runoff
faster due to prepayments and servicing fee income is reduced. Since mortgage ﬁrms
are required by GAAP rules to capitalize their servicing assets, unanticipated
prepayments cause large accounting losses. For example, the FDIC recently reported
that the 48 largest commercial banks saw the value of their servicing rights fall by
$990 million during the third quarter of 1998, due to a surge of mortgage reﬁnancing
during that period.2 Furthermore, those same institutions were able to successfully
hedge only $746 million of that decline in value, producing net losses of $244 million
due to unanticipated prepayments.
Those outside the industry may not appreciate that mortgage servicers typically
acquire loans through multiple origination channels. These include networks of retail
branches and loan production ofﬁces, corporate relationships, referrals from real estate
brokers, telephone and internet-based sales units, as well as third party originators,
such as mortgage brokers and loan correspondents. In addition, bulk packages of loans
or loan servicing rights trade among lenders and investment bankers post-origination.
The mortgage broker receives his or her compensation from the borrower in terms of
origination fees and points; they may also receive an origination fee from the majorTHIRD PARTY ORIGINATORS AND MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT RISK 57
lender at the time the submitted loan application is funded. Correspondents, like
brokers, receive origination fees and points from borrowers; moreover, they may re-
sell the loan to the lender at a capital gain, in the event its note rate exceeds current
market rates at the time of sale. These relationships promote efﬁciency in the national
mortgage market, allowing capital to ﬂow to those areas of the country where loan
demand is greatest, even if suppliers of funds are located in other parts of the country.
Mortgage brokers play an increasing role in mortgage origination, with an estimated
market share of 52% of new loan production during 1997 (LaMalfa, 1998).3 The
increasing share of loan origination by mortgage brokers is due to their lower cost
structure and incentive compensation, which attracts the most ambitious loan ofﬁcers
to brokerage, according to LaMalfa. Clearly mortgage brokers play an important role
in decimating information on market conditions to relatively less informed consumers.
Contracts between lenders and TPOs typically include non-solicitation clauses;4 the
lender does not want the correspondent or the broker to encourage borrowers to re-
ﬁnance when rates fall or it is otherwise advantageous5 for the borrower to do so. Yet
the broker and correspondent earn their living by transaction volume and, like other
brokers, have an economic incentive to ‘‘churn’’ the customer. Moreover, since it is
relatively easier6 to complete transactions with existing customers than to locate new
customers, brokers and correspondents have incentives to breach these non-solicitation
provisions and encourage their customers to ‘‘re-ﬁnance early and re-ﬁnance often,’’
perhaps with a different lender to conceal their actions from the original mortgagee.
For the mortgage servicer, mortgage prepayments are inherently difﬁcult to analyze.
Payoff requests arrive but the borrower is under no obligation to explain why the loan
is being prepaid. Reasons may relate to the personal circumstances of the owner: a
desire to move to a new home because of change in household composition, wealth,
or income; relocation for employment reasons; prepayment of the entire loan balance
because of windfalls such as inheritances; or reﬁnancing to take cash out of a property
to ﬁnance college education, major consumer expenditures or debt consolidation.7
Alternatively, prepayment may occur on sale of the property due to ﬁnancial duress,
perhaps in lieu of default and foreclosure, or to convert from one type of mortgage
to another, for example, from an adjustable rate mortgage to a ﬁxed rate one.8 Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, mortgage prepayment is more likely to occur when
interest rates fall and the borrower’s call option is in the money.9 But disentangling
these myriad reasons for prepayment is not easy. Accordingly, monitoring TPO
behavior after a loan acquisition is costly to the lender.
Literature Review
The mortgage market has evolved considerably over the past twenty years, with the
evolution of a wide array of alternative instruments and the expansion of the secondary
market, including a variety of mortgage-based derivatives. Researchers have
recognized that contingent claims methodologies can provide important insights into
market workings. A mortgage loan may be viewed as a ﬁxed income instrument
combined with American put and call options held by the borrower and written by
the lender. The right to prepay the mortgage at any time is a call option at par; the58 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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ability to default on the mortgage at any time is a put option in which the mortgage
is sold to the lender for the market value of the property. Prepayment options are
more likely to be exercised when interest rates fall; default options are more likely to
be exercised when house prices fall.10 Hendershott and Van Order (1987) provide a
survey of representative pricing model results. Kau, Keenan, Mueller and Epperson
(1992) develop a formal treatment of the valuation problem for ﬁxed rate mortgages.
Research into mortgage prepayment has taken a number of approaches. Theoretical
work focuses on valuation and optimal exercise of the embedded call option to prepay
as rates ﬂuctuate over time (Kau and Kim, 1991; Follain, Scott and Yang, 1992; and
McConnell and Singh 1994). Methodological issues and modeling techniques are
summarized in Kang and Zenios (1992). Empirical research often uses mortgage pool
data, where loan level information is largely limited to pool type, issuer, time and
weighted average note rate. Peters, Pinkus and Askin (1984), Richard and Roll (1988),
Schwartz and Torous (1989, 1992) and Foster and Van Order (1990-1991) address
single family residential mortgage prepayments using pool data; and Elmer and
Haidorfer (1997) examine prepayments on multi-family mortgage backed securities.
Empirical research initially focused on the role of borrower demographic
characteristics affecting mobility, in addition to the effect of interest rate movements
(Green and Shoven, 1986; and Quigley, 1988). More recently, interest has focused on
borrower characteristics that might impede reﬁnancing, even when it may be optimal
for the borrower to do so given prevailing mortgage rate levels (Peristiani, Bennett,
Monsen, Peach and Raiff, 1997; Archer and Ling 1997; Archer, Ling and McGill,
1996; Green and LaCour-Little, 1998; and Crawford and Wu, 1998). Another recent
trend in the literature is to explicitly model the competing risks of default and
prepayment (Deng, Quigley and Van Order, 1996; and Abrahams, 1997).
While most mortgage bankers and Wall Street participants11 in the mortgage bond
market generally agree that wholesale, or TPO, loans exhibit greater prepayment speed
than do retail loans, this article is the ﬁrst known academic research on the topic. In
the next section, we sketch out the basic economic argument for why we might expect
to observe such a pattern. Chun and LaCour-Little (1998) develop a more complete
formal treatment of the agency problem as it applies to contracts between lenders and
third party originators and mortgage prepayment risk.
The Agency Problem with TPO
The relationship between the third party loan originator and the subsequent loan
purchaser may be viewed in the context of the classic principal-agent problem.12 For
a review of this literature, see Hart and Holmstrom (1987) and Mas-Colell, Whinston
and Green (1995). Since lenders incur origination costs to obtain mortgage loan assets,
proﬁtability depends, in part, on the duration of the stream of borrower payments.
The duration of loan payments depends, in part, on the hidden actions of the agent,
who may encourage the customer to reﬁnance or not, as well as states of nature (the
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actions of the agent are unobservable by the principal, the loan purchaser, who only
observes whether the loan prepays and cannot determine whether the agent has
induced or encouraged the borrower’s behavior.13 If the agent’s behavior were
observable, the sole issue is how the principal and agent are to share the unsystematic
risk of proﬁtability. The optimal contract will specify a certain payment contingent
on a speciﬁed level of the agent’s effort,14 and this level of effort will be guaranteed
as long as the contract is in force. The risk preferences of the principal and the agent
will determine how to share other risks associated with states of nature and borrower
characteristics. For example, in the case of the risk neutral principal and the risk
adverse agent, a ﬁxed fee structure paid by the principal to the agent would represent
the optimal contract.15 As a result, the agent will be fully insured against any
unsystematic risk. On the other hand, if the agent is risk neutral, a contingent contract
based on the outcome will be optimal, and consequently the agent will absorb all the
unsystematic risk.
The optimal contract when the agent’s actions are unobservable involves a risk-
incentive tradeoff. In other words, there exists a tradeoff between gains from the
provision of extra incentives and losses from inefﬁcient risk sharing. Suppose that the
agent is risk averse and is paid a ﬁxed amount that is independent of outcome. (This
is the case, we argue, when TPOs are paid an up front fee by the lender, regardless
of future loan performance.) Knowing that there is no reward for extra costly effort,
the agent will exert no effort. Therefore, the principal has to offer the agent more
compensation that depends upon observable outcome. As a result, the agent gains
from the extra incentives but shares part of the risk. In the mortgage case at hand,
the lender might compensate the TPO over the time (to the extent the loan does not
prematurely prepay) and the present value of those payments would exceed what the
TPO would receive if paid at the time of loan origination. But these are not the
contractual arrangements currently in place. Accordingly, with no incentives to
discourage reﬁnancing, the agent chooses to encourage it. Given these adverse
incentives, we expect to observe higher rates of prepayment among TPO loans.
Methodology
Prepayment research using loan level data is typically based on techniques of survival
analysis, which originated in biological studies of mortality and has also found
frequent application in industrial engineering failure time studies. Loans ‘‘die’’ prior
to scheduled maturity from either default or prepayment. Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice
(1980) and Cox and Oakes (1985) provide classic statistical treatments of the topic;
Allison (1995) may be consulted for many practical examples using a wide range of
examples, drawn from both medicine and sociology; Kiefer (1988) provides an
economics literature review of duration modeling.16 Data censoring is the principal
econometric problem encountered, since loans that have not prepaid as of the end of
the study period have their prepayment time censored; that is, we cannot observe the
time-to-prepayment for loans that have not yet prepaid. Techniques to accommodate
data censoring are needed, with the proportional and non-proportional hazard partial
likelihood approaches most popular.60 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Proportional hazards models were developed by Cox (1972), hence, the frequent
reference in the literature to Cox regression, which really refers both to the model
and the estimation method. In its simplest form, without time-dependent covariates,
the model for prepayment is:
h(t) 5 l (t)*exp(b x 1 ... b x ), (1) i 01 i1 ki k
where hi(t) is the hazard of prepayment as a function of time and a vector of
explanatory variables, X, and l0(t) is the baseline hazard for an individual whose
covariates all have values of zero. Taking logs of both sides we have:
log h(t) 5 a(t) 1 b x 1 ... b x . (2) i 1 i1 ki k
To modify the basic model to allow for time varying covariates (such as interest rates),
simply add a subscript t to those that vary over time. For example, if x2 varies with
time, then a two-factor model could be written:
log h(t) 5 a(t) 1 b x 1 b x (t). (3) i 1 i12 i2
The model is estimated by the method of partial likelihood. While there are advantages
to the Cox regression approach for comparative statics, a principle disadvantage is the
necessity of specifying a baseline hazard function. Actual predicted prepayment rates
(the values of the hazard function over time) are highly dependent on the assumed
underlying baseline function.
An alternative to the proportional hazards methodology is the discrete-time approach
described by Allison (1995) in which the unit of observation, in the mortgage
termination case, is transformed from loans, to loan-months. Loans are observed
during each month of their life; in any month, a loan either prepays or it does not.
We observe these loan-months and the characteristics, some time-invariant (such as
property location) and some time-dependent (such as the spread between contract and
market rate). Each loan contributes as many observations to the data set as the number
of periods between its origination and its termination, by prepayment or censoring.
Since resulting data sets tend to be unmanageably large, it is customary to over-sample
the event of interest, in this case, months in which loan prepayment occurs. A roughly
equal number of non-event months are randomly drawn to complete the data set. This
technique accommodates the censored data problem, since observations are each
month and hence are conditional on the loan having survived up until that point.
Moreover, a simple binary logistic regression may be employed once the data have
been suitably transformed. The familiar logit model is speciﬁed as:
Prob(P 5 1uX ) 5 exp(BX)/(1 1 exp(BX)), (4) it it it it it it
where X 5 X1t, X2t,...XKt, representing k explanatory variables indexed by month t,
and Bi is the estimated effect17 of characteristic Xi on the probability that P 5 1; here,
P 5 1 if the loan prepaid in month t, P 5 0, if not. Note that some of the variables,
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market rate, and some are not, such as whether the loan was originated by a third
party (TPO). In the empirical analysis presented, a relatively simple speciﬁcation is
used, since our focus here is on the effect of origination channel (the sign of the
indicator variable THIRDPTY). Explanatory variables are discussed next.
Since the dollar savings on reﬁnancing depend both on rate reduction and loan
amount, original loan balance (ORIBAL) is included as an explanatory variable. We
expect larger loans to be more likely to prepay, given the same reﬁnancing incentive.
The variable MONTH measures loan age and a squared version (MONTHSQ) is also
included, to capture possible non-linearity in the effect of time on reﬁnancing
probability. The borrower’s incentive to reﬁnance (a rough proxy for the value of the
borrower’s call option) is measured as the spread between contract rate and the ten-
year constant maturity Treasury rate (INCENTIVE). To compute reﬁnancing incentive,
we considered using matched maturity mortgage rates, such as the FHLMC’s survey
report of ﬁfteen- and thirty-year mortgage rates. But to choose any particular rate is,
in effect, to assume that borrowers only reﬁnance into the same product. This is clearly
an unrealistic assumption because, for example, when rates drop a borrower might
elect to shift to a ﬁfteen-year term to pay off their mortgage more quickly, while
leaving monthly payment costs relatively unchanged. Likewise, when the slope of
yield curve increases, a borrower might choose to reﬁnance into an adjustable rate
product even if the spread between note rate and current market rate for the same
product is minimal. In contrast, the ten-year Treasury rate provides a general proxy
for the level of interest rates. As a proxy for unmeasured borrower characteristics that
may affect prepayment risk, we also include the variable INCOME, representing
borrower annual income at time of loan origination. Finally, we include the variable
THIRDPTY, an indicator variable set equal to one, if a mortgage broker or other third
party originated the loan, and zero otherwise.
Data
Two sets of data are used. A national mortgage loan-servicing ﬁrm who prefers
anonymity provided the ﬁrst data set, consisting of loan level information on 16,974
ﬁxed-rate mortgage loans originated during calendar year 1992 at an average note
rate of 8.45%. Collateral is highly diversiﬁed geographically, with the largest
concentrations of loans from New York, California and Illinois. About half are thirty-
year and half ﬁfteen-year term. Both conforming and nonconforming loans are
included. Loan payoff behavior is tracked through 1997 and defaulting loans are
excluded. By year-end 1997, about 80% of these loans had prepaid. While additional
data on adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs) was available, deﬁning the borrower’s
incentive to reﬁnance in the case of ARMs is much more difﬁcult given annual rate
adjustments. Accordingly, ARM loans were dropped from the ﬁnal analysis and will
be the topic of later research. Exhibit 1 gives summary statistics on the loan level
data set including geographic distribution and payoff experience by year.
Since loan level data was from a single servicing ﬁrm, the question arises whether
results may be generalized to the broader mortgage market. To test for similarities to
the overall mortgage market, a second data set from the commercial provider62 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 1
Descriptive Statistics: Entire Data Set
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
ORIBAL ($ 000) 138.90 106.10 10.8 1,945
INTRATE 8.45 0.58 5.5 10.375
PREPAY 0.79 0.40 0 1
15YEAR 0.53 0.50 0 1
JUMBO 0.16 0.37 0 1
THIRDPTY 0.48 0.50 0 1
Payoff Pattern: Total originated in 1992 5 16,974; Prepaid in 1993 5 5,758; Prepaid in 1994 5 2,977;
Prepaid in 1995 5 1,277; Prepaid in 1996 5 1,830; Prepaid in 1997 5 1,593; and Not Prepaid as of
12/31/97 5 3,539. Geographic Distribution: California 5 16.9%; Florida 5 6.6%; Illinois 5 11.4%;
New York 5 27.3%; and All Other States 5 37.8%.
Exhibit 2
Thirty-Year Conforming FRM: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
ORIBAL ($) 112.70 45.5 10.8 202.3
INTRATE 8.67 0.50 6.50 10.38
PREPAY 0.82 0.38 0 1
INCOME ($) 70.5 47.6 0 941
THIRDPTY 0.54 0.50 0 1
Note: N 5 6,836 loans.
Mortgage Information Corporation (MIC) was examined. MIC compiles delinquency,
default and prepayment data in cross-tabular format based on a population of some
twenty-four million loans nationwide. Since loan level information is not available in
this data set, we conﬁne our analysis to a comparison of mean prepayment speeds by
loan product and origination year stratiﬁed by TPO versus retail origination channel.
Results
Initially, separate analyses were performed on the thirty-year and ﬁfteen-year,
conforming and non-conforming, loan types. Each exhibit ﬁrst shows the descriptive
statistics for that particular product type, at the loan level, and then the results of the
logistic regression. Exhibits 2–9 show results for thirty-year conforming FRM, the
ﬁfteen-year conforming FRM, the thirty-year jumbo FRM and the ﬁfteen-year jumbo
FRM, respectively. Exhibits 10–11 show the results for all loan types, but separately
estimated for TPO versus retail loan types (controlling for loan term and conforming
loan status through additional indicator variables, JUMBO and 15YEAR). TheTHIRD PARTY ORIGINATORS AND MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT RISK 63
Exhibit 3
Thirty-Year Conforming FRM: Logistic Regression Results
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Sq Odds Ratio
Intercept 27.06 0.17 1,694 na
MONTH 0.22 0.01 883 1.25
MONTHSQ ,20.01 ,0.01 509 1.00
INCENTIVE 0.55 0.03 281 1.75
ORIBAL ,0.01 ,0.01 9.10 1.00
INCOME ,0.01 ,0.01 1.86 1.00
THIRDPTY 3.35 0.09 1,430 28.60
Note: The dependent variable is PREPAY; 22 LOG L 5 4,566; Pseudo R2 5 .33; and N 5 11,195
loan months.
Exhibit 4
Fifteen-Year Conforming FRM: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ORIBAL ($) 95.3 45.80 15.0 202.3
INTRATE 8.25 0.57 6.63 10.38
PREPAY 0.77 0.42 0 1
INCOME ($) 80.20 63.7 0 1,180
THIRDPTY 0.42 0.49 0 1
Note: N 5 7,892 loans.
Exhibit 5
Fifteen-Year Conforming FRM: Logistic Regression Results
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Sq Odds Ratio
Intercept 27.06 0.16 1,874 na
MONTH 0.26 ,0.01 1,241 1.30
MONTHSQ ,20.01 ,0.01 820 1.00
INCENTIVE 0.25 0.03 80 1.28
ORIBAL ,0.01 ,0.01 11 1.00
INCOME ,20.01 ,0.01 0.03 1.00
THIRDPTY 3.98 0.09 1,848 53.5
Note: The dependent variable is PREPAY; 22 LOG L 5 5,622; Pseudo R2 5 .34; and N 5 13,558
loan months.64 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 6
Thirty-Year Non-Conforming FRM: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ORIBAL ($) 301.9 95 202.4 1,425
INTRATE 8.78 0.49 7.00 10.38
PREPAY 0.90 0.29 0 1
INCOME ($) 154 99 46 1,183
THIRDPTY 0.63 0.48 0 1
Note: N 5 1,307 loans.
Exhibit 7
Thirty-Year Non-Conforming FRM: Logistic Regression Results
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Sq Odds Ratio
Intercept 24.10 0.29 193.70 NA
MONTH 0.07 0.01 33.60 1.08
MONTHSQ ,20.01 ,0.01 18.90 1.00
INCENTIVE 1.35 0.08 289 3.86
ORIBAL ,20.01 ,0.01 1.03 1.00
INCOME ,20.01 ,0.01 4.28 1.00
THIRDPTY 0.46 0.11 18.30 1.56
Note: The dependent variable is PREPAY; 22 LOG L 5 518; Pseudo R2 5 .22; and N 5 2,072 loan
months.
Exhibit 8
Fifteen-Year Non-Conforming FRM: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
ORIBAL ($) 315.70 108 203 1,575
INTRATE 8.42 0.58 6.63 10.0
PREPAY 0.88 0.33 0 1
INCOME ($) 229 150 67.8 1,096
THIRDPTY 0.62 0.48 0 1
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Exhibit 9
Fifteen-Year Non-Conforming FRM: Logistic Regression Results
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Sq Odds Ratio
Intercept 25.35 0.45 143 na
MONTH 0.14 0.02 55 1.15
MONTHSQ ,20.01 ,0.01 29 1.00
INCENTIVE 1.08 0.10 114 2.97
ORIBAL ,0.01 ,0.01 3.10 1.00
INCOME ,20.01 ,0.01 0.84 1.00
THIRDPTY 1.69 0.18 86.80 5.42
Note: The dependent variable is PREPAY; 22 LOG L 5 385; Pseudo R2 5 .29; and N 5 1,110 loan
months.
Exhibit 10
Retail Loans Only: Logistic Regression Results
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Sq Odds Ratio
Intercept 24.33 0.12 1,325 NA
MONTH 0.14 0.01 653 1.15
MONTHSQ ,20.01 ,0.01 263 1.00
INCENTIVE 0.19 0.02 79 1.21
ORIBAL ,20.01 ,0.01 0.41 1.00
JUMBO 0.80 0.08 98 2.20
INCOME ,20.01 ,0.01 37.7 1.00
15YEAR 0.07 0.04 3.2 1.07
Note: The dependent variable is PREPAY; 22 LOG L 5 3,646; Pseudo R2 5 .19; and N 5 17,396
loan months.
difference in the magnitude of the coefﬁcient on the variable INCENTIVE between
TPO and retail loans provides some indication of the relative sensitivity of each
borrower type to reﬁnancing opportunities. We expect TPO loans to be more
responsive to reﬁnancing incentives relative to retail loans.
While there are differences among product types, regression results are remarkably
consistent, with most parameter estimates signiﬁcant at the 99% level. MONTH is
consistently positive, ranging in value from 0.07–0.26. MONTHSQ is consistently
negative, indicating the time has a non-linear effect on reﬁnancing probability. As
expected, INCENTIVE is consistently positive, ranging in values from a low of 0.25
(for the ﬁfteen-year conforming product) to a high of 1.35 (for thirty-year non-
conforming FRM). These results conﬁrm the usual ﬁnding that prepayment probability66 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 11
TPO Loans Only: Logistic Regression Results
Variable Estimate Standard Error Wald Chi-Sq Odds Ratio
Intercept 26.17 0.15 1,761 NA
MONTH 0.32 0.01 1,202 1.38
MONTHSQ 20.01 ,0.01 901 1.00
INCENTIVE 1.22 0.04 816 3.39
ORIBAL ,0.01 ,0.01 19 1.00
JUMBO 20.45 0.11 18 0.63
INCOME ,0.01 ,0.01 1.0 1.00
15YEAR 0.62 0.05 130 1.87
Note: The dependent variable is PREPAY; 22 LOG L 5 5,054; Pseudo R2 5 .33; and N 5 12,472
loan months.
increases with loan age and, of course, increases dramatically as the spread to market
rate increases (as the option to prepay is in-the-money). Moreover, the magnitude of
the coefﬁcient on INCENTIVE is larger in the case of the thirty-year loans, compared
to the ﬁfteen-year loans, consistent with the notion that borrowers obtain greater
beneﬁts from reﬁnancing as remaining loan term increases. The effect of loan size
(ORIBAL) is not consistent, and is negative (but not statistically signiﬁcant) in the
case of thirty-year non-conforming FRM. Likewise, the effect of income is not
statistically signiﬁcant in three out of the four regressions and, in the case in which
it is statistically signiﬁcant, the magnitude is too small to be of any economic
signiﬁcance. The indicator variable for a third party originator (THIRDPTY), however,
is large, positive and highly statistically signiﬁcant across all regressions, ranging in
value from 0.45–3.98.
In Exhibits 10 and 11, separate regressions for all loans stratiﬁed by TPO status are
presented. The coefﬁcient on INCENTIVE is 0.19 for retail loans and 1.21 for TPO
loans. By taking the exponent of these values, we have a summary measure of the
increase in the odds of prepayment, holding other factors constant. Results suggest
that TPO loans are about three times more sensitive to reﬁnancing incentives
compared to retail loans.
Market level data tell a similar story, though differences are less dramatic. In Exhibit
12, TPO loans exhibit consistently higher average prepayment speeds across all
products going back to 1994 loan cohorts. The pattern appears to reverse with 1993
and earlier cohorts, however. This result could occur if third parties focus their
attention mainly on recent customers or if, over time, third party effects dissipate as
those borrowers inclined to reﬁnance do so, leaving behind a pool of relatively less
rate sensitive, or relatively more constrained, borrowers. While these differences in
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Exhibit 12
Aggregate Market Totals: July 1998 National Prepayment Speeds (in SMM)
30-Year FRM 15-Year FRM T-Bill ARMs
Orig. Year Retail TPO Retail TPO Retail TPO
1998 0.25 0.66 0.15 0.31 0.61 1.44
1997 1.43 1.92 0.90 1.04 3.37 4.34
1996 2.31 2.74 1.31 1.47 4.21 5.16
1995 2.53 2.66 1.51 1.69 4.51 5.56
1994 2.09 2.34 1.21 1.36 3.86 3.54
1993 1.45 1.38 1.03 1.15 3.57 3.11
1992 2.73 2.56 1.51 1.59 2.99 3.11
Pre-1992 2.81 2.74 1.94 1.76 2.53 2.49
Source: Mortgage Information Corporation. Mean values use approximately 24 million loan
records.
estimates, our interest here is the direction of the relationship, not precise predicted
values.
Conclusion
Empirical results are consistent with the arguments advanced. Loan purchasers can
monitor credit risk in the loans purchased from third parties, but prepayment risk
differences are much more difﬁcult to observe, due to the array of reasons that may
cause borrowers to prepay, or fail to prepay. But third parties have economic incentives
to re-ﬁnance existing loan customers at the expense of the current loan owners who
bear all the prepayment risk. Both parties might beneﬁt from more efﬁcient risk-
sharing contracts. Loan level results show that loans originated through third parties
are signiﬁcantly more likely to prepay, after controlling for re-ﬁnancing incentive,
loan size and type, loan age and borrower income. Moreover, third party loans appear
about three times as sensitive to reﬁnancing incentives, compared to retail loans.
Aggregate market level results appear generally consistent with the effects described
at the loan level. Informal conversations with investment houses and mortgage traders
indicate that this risk is widely appreciated, if imperfectly quantiﬁed. Future research
might explore the extent to which these differences are priced in the mortgage-backed
securities market, develop more precise estimates of the magnitude of the difference
in prepayment speeds and formally develop optimal contracts between mortgage
lenders and third party originators, given prepayment risk.
Business implications of this research are clear. Buyers of mortgages, MBS and
mortgage derivatives should consider with care the source of the collateral behind the68 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 17, NUMBER 1/2, 1999
ﬁnancial assets they are purchasing. Securities issuers could provide valuable
information to the bond market through additional disclosures about the extent of
TPO origination in mortgage pools. Finally, mortgage banking ﬁrms may wish to re-
structure contracts with TPOs to reduce the agency problem documented here.
Notes
1 Technically, prepayments are all non-scheduled payments of principal, including full and
partial prepayments, calculated as a percentage of beginning of period outstanding loan balance.
Partial prepayments, sometimes called curtailments since they shorten loan term but not
contractual payments, are assumed here to be de minimus. For a complete treatment of the
topic of curtailment, see Fu (1998).
2 Ross Waldrop of the FDIC quote in the National Mortgage News, Dec 21, 1998, p. 1.
3 Tom Lamalfa in a speech at the annual convention of the National Association of Mortgage
Brokers, as reported in Inside Mortgage Finance, June 26, 1998.
4 A representative contract provision reads, ‘‘After the sale of any mortgage loan to Purchaser,
TPO shall not solicit the customer or borrower for any purpose, including reﬁnancing.’’ These
provisions are construed narrowly, so as not to preclude broad-based advertising by brokers or
correspondents, which might reach existing mortgage customers.
5 Brokers, in particular, are sales people and they may promote a switch in mortgage products
even when rates are relatively stable. For example, a broker might encourage a thirty-year FRM
borrower to switch to the newly available hybrid 5/1 ARM product which, priced off the short
end of the yield curve, would typically carry rates 50–75 basis points below the conventional
thirty-year rate.
6 Lenders have more information about existing loan customers who, after all, have already
successfully obtained mortgage loans so, absent recent ﬁnancial problems, they are more likely
to be approved for new loans. This statement holds if the re-ﬁnancing sought is only rate and
term, not cash-out reﬁnancing, which typically involves somewhat tighter underwriting
standards.
7 Reﬁnancing to take cash out and pay off consumer debt is particularly attractive since 1986
changes to the tax law made most consumer interest non-deductible.
8 This is a relatively under-explored area: when and why do mortgage borrowers switch from
ARM to FRM or vice-versa? Existing research on mortgage choice considers the decision as a
one-time event, not a decision the borrower may revisit from time to time, as market conditions
change.
9 This is referred to as ‘‘rate-term’’ reﬁnancing in the industry.
10 Though in empirical work, both of these options appear to be highly under-exercised relative
to formal option model predictions.
11 For instance, comments of participants in a presentation of this research at
SolomonSmithBarney’s mortgage research department, January 6, 1998.
12 The principal-agent problem is most often formulated as that of a owner employing a manager
whose unobservable effort affects ultimate proﬁtability. The question then is what is the optimal
contract between the principal and the agent.
13 It is this difﬁculty in establishing the connection between the agent’s behavior and the
borrower’s actions that makes monitoring so difﬁcult. By way of contrast, consider the simplicity
of recourse provisions against the agent in the event of default: if the borrower is late in makingTHIRD PARTY ORIGINATORS AND MORTGAGE PREPAYMENT RISK 69
payments for some speciﬁed number of days, the principal simply demands that the loan
originator repurchase the loan.
14 We deﬁne effort as follows: the agent encourages the borrower to stay with the current lender
or at least does not interfere with the borrower’s decision to prepay or not to prepay.
15 Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green prove this point in Proposition 14.B.1. The optimal contract
speciﬁes that the agent chooses the action e* that maximizes [*pƒ(pue)dp 2 n21 (u 1 g(e))]
and the principal pays the agent a ﬁxed amount.
16 Broadly, one may study the duration of time until an event occurs with the accelerated failure
time model, the rate at which the event occurs per unit of time with hazard models, or the
conditional probability of the event’s occurrence at a particular point in time with discrete
models. Although not equivalent, all approaches are concerned with explaining the same sort
of phenomenon.
17 Interpretation of the coefﬁcients varies, depending on whether the explanatory variable is
continuous or binary. The convenient transformation, exp(Bi), gives a simple measure of the
strength of the covariate’s effect on the probability of the dependent’s variable’s occurrence.
See, for example, DeMaris (1992) for a detailed review of logistic regression.
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